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INTRODUCTION
In a 2019 House Oversight and Reform Committee hearing, Representative
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez played a caustic “lightning-round game” of corruption.1
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020. Thank you to the William & Mary
Bill of Rights Journal staff for its invaluable help throughout the publication process. Thank
you to my parents, Aline and Jean-Luc, for their continuous encouragement. I would be nowhere
without their endless love and support. En un mot: merci.
1 Voting Rights, Campaign Finance and Ethics Legislation, C-SPAN (Feb. 6, 2019),
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Posing as the “bad guy,” she described a series of hypothetical scenarios in which
her elected position could allow her to neglect the interests of the American people
for private gain with complete impunity.2 “We have a system that is fundamentally
broken,” she austerely summarized.3 Broadening her chessboard to encompass the
President, she further asked whether ethical regulations to curtail corrupt behavior
of the Chief Executive had “more teeth” than those designed for the legislative branch.4
Mr. Shaub, former head of the federal ethics office answered, “[T]here’s almost no
laws at all that apply to the President.”5 Relentlessly, Ocasio-Cortez went on: “It is
already super legal . . . for me to be a pretty bad guy. [So] it is even easier for the
President to be one, I would assume.”6 Shaub sternly replied: “That’s right.”7 Check-
mate. Political corruption is legal in the United States.8
While it is undeniable that the President is scarcely subject to ethical regula-
tions,9 the Constitution narrates a different story. Imbued with republican ideals that
feared corruption as the ultimate threat to democracy,10 the Framers designed an
Executive anti-corruption framework.11 Indeed, the Constitution contains three
clauses that were expressly drafted to shield the President from corruption: two
Emoluments Clauses and the Impeachment Clause.12 The Foreign Emoluments
Clause essentially forbids the President from receiving any profit, advantage, gain,
or benefit from foreign governments without Congress’s approval.13 The Domestic
Emoluments Clause further prevents the President from receiving emoluments,
besides his salary, from the federal and state governments.14 The Impeachment
https://www.c-span.org/video/?457611-1/voting-rights-campaign-finance-ethics-legislation
[https://perma.cc/SLA5-A88P].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Tim Wyatt, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Delivers Devastating Dissection of US Fi-
nancial System and Political Corruption in Congress Speech, INDEP. (Feb. 8, 2019, 11:57 AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-con
gress-speech-campaign-finance-corruption-election-aoc-a8769381.html [https://perma.cc
/6GFE-FYLJ].
9 See ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHING TRUMP 85 (2018); LAURENCE
TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT 32 (2018).
10 See Deborah Samuel Hills, The Foreign Emoluments Clause: Protecting Our National
Security Interests, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 63–65 (2018).
11 See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he Constitution carries within it an anti-corruption principle”).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 4.
13 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language
and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806, at 1–2 (June 30, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2995693 [https://perma.cc/6Q3A-QFYV].
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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Clause completes this framework by allowing for the President’s removal from office
in case of “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”15
In essence, this Note demonstrates that the Constitution contains an Executive
anti-corruption framework, which was seen as the Republic’s salvation against abuses
of power—the paramount threat to democratic stability. It finds that the Framers’
fear of foreign influences and distrust in human nature led them to design an ex-
tensively broad framework meant to withstand the test of time. After witnessing the
deeply corrupted state of the European kingdoms,16 they decided to encourage future
leaders to always protect the nation’s interests by requiring a different kind of
virtue—that of an unprecedented allegiance to the law. This distrust of human nature
steered the Framers towards the promotion of a political virtue instead of mere
moral virtue, which infused the Constitution with a certain republican “spirit.”
Part I explores the legal history of political corruption in an attempt to seek out
the fundamental ideals that inspired the Framers. Part II discusses the foundations
of the Executive anti-corruption framework by delving into the reasoning behind the
Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses and the Impeachment Clause. Part III
dissects the constitutional text of the three clauses and comes to the conclusion that
the Framers sought to establish a broad, potent, and adaptable framework against
corruption. Part IV argues that this framework is rooted in republican ideals promot-
ing political virtue and a duty of allegiance to the law. Finally, this Note concludes
that a violation of the Emoluments Clauses, if proven, is grounds for impeachment.
I. LEGAL HISTORY OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Throughout history, corruption has had many connotations and meanings,
ranging from loss of physical form to societal infection.17 While most would agree
that certain acts such as bribery, favoritism, and nepotism indeed constitute corrup-
tion, there is little consensus on what corruption generally entails.18 We certainly
know that it is immoral, but we are not exactly sure what “it” truly is. In most
instances, however, corruption has been intrinsically linked with ethical condemna-
tion in the realm of politics.19 Generally speaking, corruption can be seen as an act
of selfishness compromising the common good.20 Thus, this Part explores the history
15 Id. art. II, § 4.
16 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at
30–33 (1969).
17 See BRUCE BUCHAN & LISA HILL, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF POLITICAL CORRUP-
TION 9 (2014); Barry Hindess, Introduction to CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS 1–4
(Manuhuia Barcham et al. eds., 2012).
18 See Richard Mulgan, Aristotle on Legality and Corruption, in CORRUPTION: EXPANDING
THE FOCUS, supra note 17, at 25.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 27.
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and concerns behind the infamous concept of corruption before examining the Fram-
ers’ fear of, and proactive fight against, political corruption.
A. Corruption: A Classical View
Philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome were often animated by questions of
political systems and good governance, which inevitably led them to examine the
effects of corruption on said questions. Plato, for instance, weighed ideal and inferior
states using “decay” (diaphthora)—which translates to corruption—as one of the main
balancing factors.21 In his Republic, he argued that the ideal form of government is
one where philosophers rule because they inherently do not have any desires to
rule;22 they are thus impervious to extrinsic desires and emotions that would surely
pervert the ruling class, inevitably leading the city to decay.23 Similarly, in The Poli-
tics, Aristotle designed his political ideal around outstandingly virtuous leaders.24 He
used “‘correct’ (orthos)” to define the ideal government and “‘perversions’ (parek-
baseis)” for inferior systems.25 Therefore, in both models, the key to a just government
is the morality of its leaders—the more a leader desires and is subject to perversions,
the more the city itself decays.26
Furthermore, both philosophers advanced the idea that these virtuous leaders are
conduits to the ideal form of government because they rule with society’s common
interest in mind.27 Interestingly enough, this view that innately righteous leaders have
the common interest at heart is similar to our modern conception of corruption. Cur-
rent debates view corruption as the exploitation of public office for personal gain,
or as the “illegitimate pursuit of self-interest” in preference to the common interest.28
These views further align around the idea that the most potent tool to curb
corruption is the rule of law. For Plato, all political regimes are naturally corrupt
since philosophers, the only ones fit to rule, “despise[ ] political offices.”29 Philoso-
phers would therefore never agree to rule and Plato’s ideal government is in fact
unattainable.30 However, a potential remedy to that essentially unattainable system
does exist: the rule of law.31 As such, this view of the rule of law closely resonates
21 See id. at 29.
22 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO bk.VII, at 521a–b (Alan Bloom trans., 1968).
23 Id.
24 See Mulgan, supra note 18, at 29.
25 Id.
26 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk.II, at 1104a5 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985)
(c. 335 B.C.E.); PLATO, supra note 22, at 521a–b.
27 See Mulgan, supra note 18, at 30.
28 Id. at 31.
29 PLATO, supra note 22, at 521b.
30 See Dale Hall, The Republic and the “Limits of Politics,” 5 POL. THEORY 293, 293 (1977).
31 Mulgan, supra note 18, at 32 (arguing that laws can “restrain the selfishness of the
ordinary ruler”).
2020] THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON CORRUPTION 771
with the modern concept that corruption can often be curbed by stringent regulations
that criminalize acts of corruption.
B. Political Corruption at Common Law: From Gifts to Bribery to Impeachment
Throughout the medieval times in England, the discussion regarding the ideal
ruler first approached by Greek and Roman philosophers was central to the question
of political corruption and intrinsically linked to the attainment of the common
good.32 John of Salisbury, for example, argued that the ideal ruler was a minister of
the common good and the servant of equity.33 Moreover, Salisbury seemed to see
the rule of law as the defining line between a just and corrupt ruler, believing that
“[i]f the king ruled in accord with the law, he was a just prince; however, if he broke
the law, the ruler ceased to be a monarch, . . . with the rule of a tyrant seen as a
corrupted form of monarchic rule.”34
Britain’s renewed interest in Roman law led to the revival of the classical view that
the finest tool to fight corruption is the rule of law.35 Anti-corruption laws thus began
to be drafted.36 In 1275, Edward I had several laws enacted in the First Statute of
Westminster,37 which provided that “no Sheriff, nor other the King’s officer, take any
Reward to do his Office, but shall be paid of that which they take of the King; and he
that so doth, shall yield twice as much, and shall be punished at the King’s Pleasure.”38
The development of public offices inevitably led to the emergence of corrupted
officials in seventeenth century England.39 One source of corruption was the prepon-
derance of gifts used as a means of obtaining official favor.40 Salisbury explained
that “no-one ‘who governs is to accept a present or gift,’” but did not mention bribery
per se.41 By the early seventeenth century though, “‘bribery’ was clearly understood
as a secret payment of money or gifts to public officers, whether judges, churchmen,
lawyers or scholars.”42 Given the proliferation of this practice, an effort began to
32 Manuhuia Barcham, Rule by Natural Reason: Late Medieval and Early Renaissance
Conceptions of Political Corruption, in CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS, supra note
17, at 53, 55.
33 Id.
34 Id. (citing John of Salisbury, 8 POLICRATUS 190 (1990) (c. 1159)).
35 See BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 107, 118 (“Laws were the ‘meanys to bring man
to the perfection of the cyvyle lyfe’, and without them humans ‘wylbe corrupt’ or ‘soone
oppressyd & corrupt’ by unrestrained self-interests and affections.”).
36 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 309–10 (5th
prtg., 1974).
37 James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 816, 844 (1988).
38 Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 26 (1275).
39 See BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 110–13.
40 See id. at 111.
41 Bruce Buchan, Changing Contours of Corruption in Western Political Thought, c.
1200–1700, in CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS, supra note 17, at 73, 76.
42 BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 112 (emphasis added).
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stamp out corruption in public offices. Henry VIII was said to have ordered Thomas
More “uprightly to minister indifferent justice to the people, without corruption or
affection”43 since “[i]t was by bribery that rulers were ‘corrupted, Justice perverted . . .
[and] the whole state of government disjointed and disordered.’”44
Eventually, this wave of corruption scandals led to a series of impeachments.45
Perhaps the most famous is the 1621 impeachment case for corruption of Lord Chan-
cellor Sir Francis Bacon.46 On March 15, 1621, a subcommittee inquiring into abuses
in courts raised a bribery charge against Bacon,47 which stemmed from his receiving
of payments for favorable decisions, even though such payments were not always
forthcoming.48 Bacon argued that the gifts were received after he ruled on cases, claim-
ing that it could not possibly amount to corruption.49 His defense failed, however,
since “the expectation of a gift before, during or after a case is bound to distort judge-
ment and therefore . . . Bacon’s . . . gift-giving [is an] example[ ] of corruption.”50
Bacon also attempted to diminish the gravity of his actions by explaining that
“he ‘was never noted for an avaricious man,’” and that the charges came all from
misdemeanors, thus effectively trying to use the moral element of the Classical view.51
Yet, after Bacon had made a full confession, the Lord Chancellor was impeached for
legal corruption in May and sentenced to prison for a term “during the King’s
pleasure.”52 Essentially, Bacon’s impeachment highlights the growing shift from
allowing gifts to penalizing bribery-like gifts as an inherent act of corruption.53
Moreover, this shift from gifts to bribery was further developed in eighteenth
century England through the emergence of the belief that corruption would eventu-
ally lead to the erosion of trust in Parliament.54 Andrew Fletcher, for instance,
warned that “the corruption and ‘infection of bad manners’ . . . would lead even
elected representatives to ‘artfully betray the nation . . . contrary to their known
duty, and the important trust reposed in them.’”55 Therefore, this fear of public trust
erosion also conveyed England’s concerns about degenerative moral corruption and
43 WILLIAM ROPER, THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE 219 (Richard S. Sylvester & Davis
P. Harding eds., Yale Univ. Press 1966) (1555).
44 BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 112.
45 See id.
46 Damian X. Powell, Why Was Sir Francis Bacon Impeached? The Common Lawyers
and the Chancery Revisited: 1621, 81 HIST. 511, 512 (1996).
47 Id. at 522.
48 See BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 118.
49 Id. at 119.
50 Id.
51 Buchan, supra note 41, at 85 (quoting J. R. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCU-
MENTS AD 1485–1603 WITH AN HISTORICAL COMMENTARY 332–33 (2d ed. 1951)).
52 THOMAS-PITT TASWELL LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: FROM THE
TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 354 (Theodore F.T. Plucknett ed., 11th ed. 1960).
53 See BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 116–18.
54 See id. at 131.
55 Id.
2020] THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON CORRUPTION 773
the widespread decay of virtue.56 Some even argued that corruption was a plague in
England, a generalized disease that would lead society to decline just like in Rome.57
Algernon Sidney explained that the roots of such dangers were entrenched in the
sovereign’s vice—or lack thereof.58 As such, Sidney’s view of the menaces of cor-
ruption espoused the classical view that political corruption ultimately leads to societal
degeneration and decay.59 He did, however, expand this classical view by pinpointing
the root causes of this danger: corruption of the highest public official, the King.60 In
the 1720s, political corruption became so prolific that The Craftsman published a list
for the reader to “distinguish between a bad Reign and a corrupt Administration.”61
This list included the use of methods of influence, an encouragement for luxury, and
the corruption of the “learned Fathers of the Law” as marks of a corrupt administra-
tion.62 Once again, corruption was seen as stemming mostly from politicians’ hubris
and self-interest, similar to the classical view.63
C. The Framers: Influence of the Classical & Common Law Views
As the oldest written national constitution in the world, the United States Con-
stitution was inherently experimental.64 It is thus unsurprising that the Framers drew on
established concepts of governance from classical and medieval views to design the
ideal form of government.65 Athenian concepts, in particular, were especially significant
for the Framers given the confederate nature of the Grecian republics.66 Forced to
navigate unchartered territory, the Framers used the history of previous confederate
states to draw out several republican concepts that would be embedded in the Constitu-
tion.67 As common law lawyers, most Framers were also naturally attracted by the
British concepts of governance and appraised the high level of corruption in the
eighteenth century with alarm.68 Hence, the Framers identified several key concepts
56 Id. at 131.
57 Buchan, supra note 41, at 82, 87–88.
58 ALGERNON SIDNEY, COURT MAXIMS 131–33 (Hans W. Blom et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (c. 1665).
59 Buchan, supra note 41, at 87.
60 BUCHAN & HILL, supra note 17, at 137.
61 Id. (quoting THE CRAFTSMAN, June 24, 1727).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 139.
64 See Michael Kammen, Introduction to THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
A DOCUMENTED HISTORY, at vii, xviii (Michael Kammen ed., 1986).
65 See R. A. Ames & H. C. Montgomery, The Influence of Rome on the American Consti-
tution, 30 CLASSICAL J. 19, 19–23 (1934); Teachout, supra note 11, at 350.
66 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison).
67 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton).
68 See Teachout, supra note 11, at 349.
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from classical and medieval views to be promoted, several of which were intrinsically
linked to political corruption.69
First, the Framers espoused the classical view that political corruption ultimately
leads to societal decay given its degenerative effect.70 During the Constitutional Con-
vention, George Mason voiced his concern that “if we do not provide against corrup-
tion, our government will soon be at an end.”71 The Framers thus saw bribery and
corruption as “defiling the fairest fabric that ever human nature reared,”72 and en-
visioned Britain’s internally corrupt government as “the harbinger of doom.”73 Sec-
ondly, the Framers adhered to the Greek view later developed in Enlightenment
philosophy that there is an inherent “depravity in mankind,”74 which leads rulers to
make abstraction of the common good.75 Madison indeed explained that there is
always a possibility that “[m]en of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister
designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,
and then betray the interests of the people.”76 Just like in the classical and common
law views, the Framers thus thought that rulers’ self-interest had to be curbed to
promote the common good.
Third, the Framers espoused the Classical and common law views that corrup-
tion could be curtailed by a rule of law.77 Hamilton argued that one of the “palpable
defect[s]” of the “disease” of previous failed confederate states was the absence of
a rule of law.78 He also directly linked the innate dangers of the absence of a federal
rule of law with the possibility of corruption: “The United States as now composed
have no power to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either
by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other
constitutional means.”79 According to Hamilton, the remedy was to be “[a] guaranty
by the national authority . . . against the usurpation of rulers . . . .”80
Fourth, and similar to the common law view, the Framers linked corruption to
the erosion of the public trust.81 Hamilton warned against the dangers of “[a]n
69 See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 18–20 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison).
70 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 19, at 129 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); Teachout, supra note 11, at 350–51.
71 Notes of Robert Yates (June 23, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 392 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
72 Teachout, supra note 11, at 349.
73 Id.
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 36–38 (1981).
75 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
76 Id.
77 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 140.
81 See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution,
52 GA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2017).
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avaricious man [who] might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the
acquisition of wealth.”82 If an individual is corrupt, he will necessarily serve his own
ends, and thus betray the many.83 And if that practice were to become widespread—as
many believed that it would84—the public’s trust in government legitimacy would
erode and failure of the system would ensue.85
Ultimately, it is important to note that the Framers not only used said views, but
also espoused the common denominator of most historical approaches to political
corruption: the idea that corruption is inseparable from a sense of moral obligation.86
Yet, centuries of failed republican enterprises highlighted the need for a novel
approach that would take into account the de facto corruptible nature of even the
most virtuous men.87 If even kings could be corrupted, how could they attempt to
fight this seemingly unfightable human nature? The Constitution’s executive anti-
corruption framework was to be the first piece of the puzzle. Making the Constitu-
tion itself demand allegiance to the law from its leaders was to be the second.88
II. THE FRAMERS’ FRAMEWORK: A CORRUPT-FREE EXECUTIVE
Although it is an established view that the Framers were preoccupied with the
inherent risks of political corruption on the durability and stability of the nascent
republic, scholars disagree as to how concerned the Framers truly were about
corruption.89 What is certain, however, is that they had seen how political corruption
could cause the fall of even some of the greatest empires in history.90 During the
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
83 See Teachout, supra note 11, at 374.
84 See, e.g., id.; see also Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, Letter IV (Philadelphia,
1776), in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY, supra
note 64, at 8.
85 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 20, 1787), in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 12, 12–21 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1903) (“Mr. Madison thought
it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community agst. the
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. . . . He might pervert his ad-
ministration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign
powers.” (emphasis added)).
86 Teachout, supra note 11, at 374; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 74, at
345 (James Madison); Notes of James Madison (July 19, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 71, at 52, 55.
87 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 82, at 451.
88 See discussion infra Part IV.
89 Compare Teachout, supra note 11, at 348 (adopting the claim that “[t]he Framers were ob-
sessed with corruption” (emphasis added)), and Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption,
107 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 30, 50–51 (2012) (arguing for the recognition of a free-standing
anti-corruption principle), with Seth Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor
Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 4–5, 8 (2012) (taking
the opposite view that the Framers were not particularly concerned with corruption).
90 See WOOD, supra note 16, at 35–36.
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Constitution-drafting process, recent corruption cases that had led to impeachments
in England also necessarily pressed the Framers to carefully consider the question
of political corruption.91 Consequently, they attempted to entrench anti-corruption
safeguards in the Constitution that would define corruption more broadly than what
had been done before.92 Within this framework, three provisions were specifically
constitutionalized to prevent a corrupt executive.
A. The Foreign Emoluments Clause
The first anti-corruption provision is the Foreign Emoluments Clause (FEC).93
While much of the Articles of Confederation were modified during the Constitu-
tional Convention, the Framers decided to keep the portion that was to become the
FEC.94 While the initial draft of the Constitution debated in the summer of 1787
solely prohibited titles of nobility, Charles Pinkney successfully argued for “the
necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of the U.S. independent
of external influence.”95 Indeed, the finally adopted FEC included restrictions on the
receiving of gifts as it states that “no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust
under [the United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or
foreign State.”96 The only change from the Articles of Confederation was that ex-
ceptions could be allowed if approved by Congress.97
Why then did the Framers include the FEC as “one of the more strongly worded
prohibitions in the Constitution?”98 The first reason stemmed from the Framers’
concern about a specific kind of corruption: political gifts.99 Gift-giving was indeed
a widespread diplomatic practice of that time, especially in Europe.100 In 1785, King
Louis XVI of France bestowed on Benjamin Franklin a remarkable portrait of himself
surrounded by 408 diamonds, and encompassed in a golden snuff box.101 When
91 See Patrick Henry, Speech on the Expediency of Adopting the Federal Constitution
(June 7, 1788), in 1 ELOQUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 178, at 223 (E. B. Williston ed.,
1827) (“Look at Britain; see there the bolts and bars of power; see bribery and corruption
defiling the fairest fabric that ever human nature reared.”).
92 See, e.g., DAVID ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVEN-
TION OF VIRGINIA 330, 330–31 (Richmond, Enquirer-Press 2d ed. 1805).
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
94 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 26–27 (2014).
95 Id. at 27.
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
97 See TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 27.
98 See id. at 26–27.
99 Natelson, supra note 81, at 43–45.
100 Id.
101 See TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 1.
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Franklin returned to the United States, the snuff box became a symbol of Europe’s
corruption.102 It also led to a raging debate on the latent risks of such practices.103
The main argument against diplomatic gift-receiving was that such ostentatious gifts
could come to interfere with public officials’ obligation to promote the common
good of the nation, since receiving such treasures could cause allegiances to shift.104
The second, interrelated reason arose from the more general fear that corruption
was perhaps the greatest threat to democracy. The Framers knew that the United
States was a young nation surrounded by wealthy longstanding kingdoms.105 As
such, while they loosened the prior clause of the Articles of Confederation, they
ultimately expanded the scope of the FEC considerably when they added the striking
modifier “of any kind whatsoever.”106 As Edmund Randolph explained, the FEC was
in fact “a protection against corruption.”107
B. The Domestic Emoluments Clause
The second anti-corruption safeguard, the Domestic Emoluments Clause (DEC),108
was drafted to limit the President’s salary and dependency on Congress’s resources.
The DEC mainly stems from the Framers’ belief that “man in his deepest nature was
selfish and corrupt; that blind ambition most often overcomes even the most clear-
eyed rationality; and that the lust for power was so overwhelming that no one should
ever be entrusted with unqualified authority.”109 As such, they thought to provide the
Legislature with a means to “tempt [the president] by largesses, to surrender at dis-
cretion his judgment to their inclinations,” since “power over a man’s support is . . .
power over his will.”110
In essence, the Framers had sought to build an executive more akin to a monar-
chy because they believed that “[t]he advantage of a monarch is this—he is above
corruption—he must always intend, in respect to foreign nations, the true interest
and glory of the people.”111 Yet, they recognized that the president could “have no
102 See id. at 1–3.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 2–3.
105 See Teachout, supra note 11, at 361.
106 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; see discussion infra Section III.A.2.
107 Natelson, supra note 81, at 39.
108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Ser-
vices, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period
for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”).
109 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 368
(enlarged ed. 1992).
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
111 Notes of Alexander Hamilton (June 18, 1787), reprinted in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 71, at 304, 310.
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pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him by
the Constitution.”112
C. The Impeachment Clause
The third clause that entraps the anti-corruption framework is the infamous
Impeachment Clause.113 It is also the clause that could very well be the anti-corruption
framework’s salvation.114 The clause has rarely been used to impeach presidents and
is often seen as a last remedy.115 The Framers indeed saw this mechanism as promoting
fear of punishment in the Chief Executive, which should motivate “good behavior.”116
More importantly, however, they argued that constitutionalizing a power of presi-
dential impeachment was indispensable to prevent abuses of the public trust.117
Madison warned that without an Impeachment Clause, the President could “pervert
his administration into a scheme of peculation and oppression. He might betray his
trust to foreign powers.”118 Once again, the Framers were concerned with protecting
the legitimacy of the Magistrate who could be easily subject to corruption, espe-
cially by foreign governments.119
In fact, one of the drafts of the Impeachment Clause put before the Convention in
May 1787 included “corruption” as well as “treason” and “bribery.”120 Nevertheless,
“corruption” was subsequently removed without much explanation,121 and replaced
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 110, at 442; see also Debate in the South Carolina
Legislature, Jan. 16, 1788, reprinted in 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at 251 [herein-
after South Carolina Debate] (“Hence kings are less liable to foreign bribery and corruption
than any other set of men, because no bribe that could be given them could compensate the
loss they must necessarily sustain for injuring their dominions . . . .”).
113 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
114 See discussion infra Section III.B.
115 See generally, e.g., Scott S. Barker, An Overview of Presidential Impeachment, 47
COLO. LAW. 30 (2018).
116 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 396 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117 Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 65–66.
118 Id.
119 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 110, at 441–43 (specifying that the Executive
“shall not receive . . . emolument from the United States, or any of them,” and imposing
limitations on the legislature in changing the structure of compensation).
120 Debates in the Federal Convention Of 1787, May 28, 1787, in 5 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 131 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“[The Presi-
dent] shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Delegates, and
conviction, in the supreme court, of treason, bribery, or corruption.”).
121 See Gary L. McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions
of the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626, 633–34 (1999); Teachout, supra note 11, at 367
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by “maladministration.”122 Although “corruption” and “maladministration” certainly
represent different concepts, George Mason meant to include “maladministration”
to encompass as impeachable “attempts to subvert the Constitution” that would
otherwise not fit under treason or bribery.123 “Maladministration” was thus similar
to “corruption” in that it could limit conduct involving abuses of power.124 However,
Madison feared that “maladministration” was “so vague a term [that it would] be
equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”125
Believing that holding elections every four years would effectively serve as a
fence against maladministration,126 the Framers instead decided to finalize the Im-
peachment Clause by adding “other crimes & misdeme[a]nors” to the list of offences.127
Born out of the British common law, “high crimes and misdemeanors” was repeat-
edly used during the seventeenth century for parliamentary impeachments.128 In sum,
“high crimes and misdemeanors” together with “treason” and “bribery” constituted
“those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words,
from the abuse or violation of some public trust.”129
As such, the Framers’ Executive anti-corruption framework seems to have
emerged from the very fear associated with the risks of gift-giving. More generally,
it also stemmed from the fear that corruption was perhaps the supreme menace to
the blossoming democracy. As George Mason warned during the Constitutional
Convention: “if [you did] not provide against corruption, [your] government will
soon be at an end.”130
III. INTERPRETING THE FRAMEWORK
A. The Emoluments Clauses
Since President Trump’s election in 2016, three lawsuits have been filed against
him alleging violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses in light
(arguing that a committee on style or form removed “corruption” since the Framers simply
took it out without further explanation).
122 McDowell, supra note 121, at 633.
123 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 550.
124 Laurence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic Principles, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 719 (1999).
125 Madison, supra note 85, at 407.
126 Id. (“Mr. Govr. Morris, it will not be put in force & can do no harm. An election of every
four years will prevent maladministration.”).
127 Id. (“Col. Mason withdrew ‘maladministration’ & substitutes ‘other high crimes & mis-
demenors’ agst the State.”).
128 See McDowell, supra note 121, at 638–39.
129 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
130 Notes of Robert Yates (June 23, 1787), reprinted in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 392.
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of his private business ownerships.131 While Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics
in Washington v. Trump was recently remanded back to the district court after the
case was dismissed for lack of standing,132 two other cases are currently ongoing.133
For these two cases, three questions are examined in relation with the Emoluments
Clauses: (1) Does the FEC apply to the office of the President?134 (2) What is the
definition of “emolument” and what does it encompass?135 And finally, (3) does the
President in fact need congressional approval to receive emoluments?136 This Section
examines these three questions in light of the Framers’ original anti-corruption
framework and corresponding constitutional interpretation doctrines.
1. Office of Profit or Trust Under the United States
The first challenge arising under the utilization of the Emoluments Clauses is
whether the FEC even applies to the Chief Executive.137 Given the location of the
clause in the Constitution,138 the fact that there is a separate clause to regulate the
President’s salary (and other emoluments),139 and the Framers’ differentiation between
Federal offices,140 some have argued that the FEC does not apply to the President
because he does not hold an “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States].”141
As the argument goes, since the President is elected, only the DEC could limit his
receiving of emoluments, but not the FEC.142
131 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019);
Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (alleging that Trump “has a finan-
cial interest in vast business holdings around the world that engage in dealings with foreign
governments and receive benefits from those governments,” which violates the FEC (quoting
Second Amended Complaint at 20, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-01154))); District
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018) (alleging that President Trump is
in violation of the FEC and DEC given his ongoing connection with the Trump Organization’s
ownership of the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C.).
132 See generally 939 F.3d 131.
133 Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 51; District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 878.
134 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 877–78.
135 Id.
136 Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
137 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 882–83.
138 See Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & the Judicial Education Project as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Defendant at 4–5, District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (No. 17-
1596) [hereinafter Tillman Brief]. But see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Why the Incompati-
bility Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 35,
35 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he President occupies an ‘Office under the United States’”).
139 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
140 See generally id. arts. I–II.
141 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 882–83; Tillman Brief, supra note 138, at 2, 4.
142 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 895–96; Tillman Brief, supra note 138,
at 2, 4.
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Beginning with a textual analysis of the FEC, the court in District of Columbia
v. Trump ultimately found that the President does indeed hold an “Office of Profit
or Trust” under the United States for several reasons.143 First, the court found that
the Plaintiffs were right to argue that the Constitution regularly refers to the Presi-
dent as holding an “office.”144 Article 2, for instance, states that “[the President]
shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.”145 Perhaps more convincingly,
Clause 8 of that same Article requires that the President take an oath to “faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States.”146
Second, the court drew from United States v. Sprague, which dictates that “[the
Constitution’s] ‘words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary’ . . . mean-
ing,”147 to argue that the “Office of the President” is undeniably one of both profit
and trust.148 Since the President “receives compensation for his services (profit) and
is entrusted with the welfare of the American people (trust),” the President receives
both profit through his salary and trust through his status of elected official.149 Finally,
the court drew from the rest of the constitutional text to infer that the President’s “Of-
fice of Profit or Trust” is one “under the United States.”150 Since in the DEC, for
instance, “United States” is used to differentiate between Federal and State govern-
ments, and since the president is a federal officer, he thus holds his office “[u]nder
the United States.”151
The court also found that the original meaning and purpose component of consti-
tutional interpretation points to the FEC applying to the Executive.152 For one, the
Federalist Papers refer several times to the President as occupying an office.153 Past
Executive Branch’s practices also suggest that the President does hold an Office under
the United States.154 In 2009, for example, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) stated
that “[t]he President surely ‘hold[s] an[ ] Office of Profit or Trust[.]’”155 Furthermore,
the fact that previous presidents have always sought to obtain Congress’s approval be-
fore accepting any sort of gift or other emolument shows, in itself, that past practices
143 315 F. Supp. 3d at 883.
144 Id.
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
146 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d
at 883.
147 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 883 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282
U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931)).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 884.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 885.
154 See id.
155 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33
Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2009)).
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have always assumed that the FEC does apply to the President.156 Those opposed to
such arguments could admittedly maintain that past presidents were careful and thus
sought congressional approval even if they did not necessarily need to do so.157
But another argument can be made to defend the more than likely theory that the
FEC applies to the President: that the Framers’ feared corruption and foreign influ-
ences in general.158 The court did touch on that piece of history, but it did not dwell
on it.159 In fact, given the numerous archives that demonstrate the Framers’ fear of
corruption, and of corruption at the highest levels of government, it would be extremely
hard to argue that some very minute language embedded in the Constitution sets the
office of the President aside.160
Finally, if the FEC did not apply to the Office of the President, it would mean that
the Chief Executive is inherently free to accept any gifts, emoluments, title, or office
from foreign governments. Given the Framers’ concern over the possibility of corrup-
tion through foreign government influences, it would seem very inconsistent with
their views to argue that they meant to exclude the Office of the President from the
FEC’s anti-corruption safeguard.161 Charles Pinckney, for one, broadly emphasized
“the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of the U.S. independ-
ent of external influence.”162
In sum, since the Framers gave the President a lot of leeway and power when
it comes to international relations and diplomacy,163 it is highly unlikely that they
would have also excluded this specific office from the only safeguard that would
effectively preclude undue influences from the world of international relations and
diplomacy.
2. Emoluments
The word “emolument” appears twice in the Articles of Confederation164 and
thrice in the Constitution.165 It was employed countless times throughout the
Constitution-drafting process.166 At present, two potential definitions are being
156 See, e.g., TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 2, 30.
157 See id. at 27, 29.
158 See id. at 2, 5–6.
159 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 885.
160 See, e.g., TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 2, 5–6.
161 See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F. Supp. 3d 131,
141 (2d Cir. 2009).
162 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. at 897 (citing 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789, at 389 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911)).
163 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2.
164 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2; id. art VI, para. 1.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
166 See generally John Mikhail, A Note on the Original Meaning of “Emolument,”
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advocated for. If adopted, the DOJ’s definition would qualify “emolument” as “profit
arising from an office or employ.”167 By contrast, the Plaintiffs’ advocates suggest
a broader definition that would encompass “profit,” “advantage,” “gain,” and “bene-
fit.”168 What, then, did the Framers truly intend to prevent those who would be
holding “any Office or Profit of Trust” from receiving? Indeed, “emolument” was
consistently used in different ways and held various meanings at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting.169
When faced with such uncertainty typical of constitutional interpretation, the
Court has held that “[t]he meaning of a Constitutional provision ‘begin[s] with its
text.’”170 A close examination of the actual texts of the FEC and DEC is thus war-
ranted. First, the FEC includes four crucial modifiers: “And no Person holding any
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept
of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.”171 Putting aside the dilemma of defining emoluments, the
FEC is striking because it does not leave any room for exceptions.172 Indeed, the
repetition of these modifiers—and specifically of “any present, Emolument . . .” and
of “any kind whatever” taken together—suggests, on its face, that it was drafted using
such strong language to convey the most potent prohibition.173 Secondly, in 1787,
the penultimate draft of the Constitution presented two versions; one contained no
comma after “Title,” while the second one did.174 The fact that the adopted FEC does
contain a comma suggests that the Framers in fact intended for “any kind whatever”
not only to modify “Title,” but “present,” “Emolument,” and “Office.”175
BALKINIZATION (Jan. 18, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/01/a-note-on-original
-meaning-of-emolument.html [https://perma.cc/TY83-EUVG] (listing a variety of examples
where the Framers employed the term “emolument”).
167 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 32, District of Columbia,
315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (No. 17-1596) (quoting Barclay’s A Complete English Dictionary on a
New Plan (1774)).
168 Brief of Amici Curiae by Certain Legal Historians on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 3–4, 12,
District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (No. 17-1596) (citing John Mikhail, The Definition
of “Emolument” in English Language Dictionaries, 1523–1806, SSRN, June 30, 2017).
169 Natelson, supra note 81, at 12.
170 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 881 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519 (1997)); see also Brown v. Maryland, 12 U.S. 419, 437 (1827).
171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added). Besides the FEC, only one other clause
contains the word “any” four times. See id. § 10, cl. 1.
172 See TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 28.
173 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887–88; TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 28;
see also Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case
of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 130 n.137 (2018).
174 Natelson, supra note 81, at 38. Compare Proceedings of Convention Referred to the
Committee of Style and Arrangement, reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at
572 (containing no comma after “Title”), with id. at 596 (containing a comma after “Title”).
175 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887–88; Natelson, supra note 81, at 38.
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Third, the DEC also contains a crucial modifier as it prevents the President from
receiving “any other Emolument” “for his Services” besides a “compensation.”176 In
District of Columbia v. Trump, however, the President suggested a potential inter-
pretation of the DEC where he argued that “‘compensation’ is qualified by ‘for his
services,’” meaning that “‘any other Emolument’ must also be qualified by ‘for his
services.’”177 Yet, as the Plaintiffs’ Amicus Curiae noted—which the court ultimately
agreed with—the use of the modifier “any other,” used before “Emolument,” sug-
gests, once again, that the constitutional text does not “qualify ‘emolument’ by the
words ‘for his services.’”178
Finally, the wording of the Incompatibility Clause,179 which restricts increases
in the compensation of Congress,180 also sheds some light on the breadth of both the
FEC and DEC. Indeed, the Incompatibility Clause provides that “[n]o Senator or
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any
civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created,
or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .”181
Once more, “emoluments” finds itself accompanied by a modifier—but a more
restrictive one this time.182 In this instance, the modifier “whereof” effectively refers
to emoluments tied to “an expressly referenced office.”183 In District of Columbia v.
Trump, the court agreed with Plaintiffs that the use of such modifier is proof that the
text was meant to impose some limitations on the Incompatibility Clause—in sharp
contrast with the broader FEC and DEC.184 In sum, through the use of modifiers, the
Framers “ensur[ed] a broad and expansive reach” of the FEC and DEC.185 This analysis
thus suggests that, at least textually, “emolument” should be broadly interpreted.186
As stated in District of Columbia v. Trump, constitutional interpretation must also
be “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters[.]’”187 Hence, in attempting to understand the very meaning of emoluments
as used in the Constitution, “technical meaning” must be left aside to seek out the
176 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887–88.
177 Id. at 887.
178 Id. at 887–88. But see Nourse, supra note 173, at 30 n.137 (arguing that in the DEC
“‘[e]molument from the United States,’ implies that the emolument comes from an ‘office,’” but
that in the FEC “the term ‘Emolument’ is explicitly modified by a term suggesting ‘office’”).
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
180 See id.; Natelson, supra note 81, at 32–33.
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
182 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 888.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See id. But see Nourse, supra note 173, at 130 n.137.
186 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887–88. But see Amandeep S. Grewal,
The Purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 167, 169 (2017) (arguing
that the clause refers to compensation for services alone).
187 District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 882 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008)).
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“original public meaning” of the word.188 In an attempt to do just that, Professor
Mikhail compiled an impressive study examining the definition of emoluments in ten
legal dictionaries and in forty English language dictionaries from the Sixteenth to
the eighteenth century.189 The study came to one staggering conclusion—and dealt
a brutal blow to President Trump’s defense.190 It indeed found that in every English
language dictionary published between 1604 and 1806, “emolument” is defined using
on or more of the following elements: profit, advantage, gain, or benefit.191 In fact,
Mikhail found that in “92% of these dictionaries define ‘emolument’ exclusively in
these terms, with no reference to ‘office’ or ‘employment.’”192 Alternatively, “profit
arising from an office or employ”—or DOJ’s favored definition—only “appears in
less than 8% of these dictionaries.”193
While this evidence undeniably weighs in favor of a broader definition of “emolu-
ments,” historical records of discourses leading up to the Constitution do not indicate
such a clear-cut answer. This hesitation stems from the fact that the meaning of cer-
tain references to “emoluments” in the convention records cannot be asserted with
certainty, although most appear tied to public office.194 For instance, Luther Martin
stated in November 1787 that no Senators could “leave their private concerns and
their Homes for such a period and consent to such a service, but those who place
their future views on the emoluments flowing from the General Government.”195
Benjamin Franklin is also reported as having claimed that the President “should
receive no salary, stipend or emolument for the devotion of his time to the public
services, but that his expenses should be paid.”196 In his first inaugural address, George
Washington also mentioned “emoluments” in connection with his elected position:
I must decline as inapplicable to myself any share in the per-
sonal emoluments, which may be indispensably included in a
permanent provision for the Executive Department; and must
accordingly pray that the pecuniary estimates for the Station in
which I am placed, may, during my continuance in it, be limited
188 Id. at 882 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 576); see also Greggory E. Maggs, A Concise
Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning of
the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 362–63 (2014).
189 See generally Mikhail, supra note 13; Natelson, supra note 81.
190 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 890–91.
191 Mikhail, supra note 13, at A-2 to A-4 tbl. 1.
192 Id. at 8.
193 Id.
194 Natelson, supra note 81, at 31–34.
195 Luther Martin Before the Maryland House of Representatives, Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted
in 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at 155.
196 Notes of Robert Yates (June 2, 1787), in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at
89 (emphasis omitted).
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to such actual expenditures as the public good may be thought
to require.197
In District of Columbia v. Trump, the court instead focused on historical sources
that would support, once again, a broader definition of “emoluments.”198 It quoted
George Walton’s statement that “[t]he Indian trade is of no essential service to any
Colony . . . . The emoluments of the trade are not a compensation for the expense of
donations.”199 The court also pointed out that when the Framers specifically intended
“‘emolument’ to refer only to an official salary or payments tied to holding public
office, they did so expressly.”200 In support of this argument, it quoted both Madison
and Hamilton referring to “emoluments of office.”201 Another example provided by
the court is a correspondence from Washington to Joseph Jones, where reference to
“emoluments of office” is made.202 Ultimately, the court found that “the decisive
weight of historical evidence supports the conclusion that the common understanding
of the term ‘emolument’ during the founding era was that it covered any profit, gain,
or advantage, including profits from private transactions.”203 While this conclusion
fails to take into account certain specific historical records that suggest a potentially
narrower definition of “emolument,” the consolidated weight of evidence does lend
support to viewing the FEC and DEC as essentially encompassing “anything of
value”204—regardless of whether such emolument arises from office or employ.
Perhaps the most crucial—and most intricate—element to consider in any exercise
of constitutional interpretation is the deciphering of the Framers’ actual intent.205
Before delving into the relevant evidence, it is crucial to understand the crux of the
dilemma. The difficulty with a narrow interpretation rests with the fact that it would
effectively reduce the FEC and DEC to a prohibition of bribery.206 Indeed, this narrow
197 President George Washington, Inaugural Address of 1789 (Apr. 30, 1787) (emphasis
added), https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals/inaugtxt.html [https://perma.cc
/BXV7-69CK].
198 See 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 875 (2018).
199 Id. at 893–94 (emphasis added) (quoting “[July 1776],” Founders Online, NAT’L AR-
CHIVES (last modified Apr. 12, 2018), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-02
-02-0006-0008 [https://perma.cc/8VQF-8HVM]).
200 Id. at 894.
201 Id. (emphasis added).
202 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Joseph Jones (Dec. 14,
1782), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw3h.002/?sp=388&st=text [https://perma.cc/V65L
-FGGM]).
203 Id. at 894–95.
204 See id. at 895.
205 See William Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 340, 349 (1955); see also District of Columbia, 315 F.
Supp. 3d at 895.
206 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 895; Erwin Chemerinsky et al., We’re the
Lawyers Suing President Trump: His Business Dealings Violate the Constitution, VOX (Jan. 31,
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view suggests not only that a violation of the Emoluments Clauses would arise if the
President accepted emoluments arising from office or employ, but that the President
would thus have to in fact accept such emoluments in exchange for a service.207 By
contrast, a broader interpretation would prohibit the President from accepting any emol-
uments regardless of whether a service is provided in exchange.208 Such interpretation
could have drastic consequences.209 For instance, it could mean that under the FEC,
no public official can sell goods that might be purchased by a foreign government.210
During the summer of 1787, the debate around corruption took center stage.211
Hamilton, for instance, feared that the Republic would be “liable to foreign influ-
ence and corruption” since “[m]en of little character, acquiring great power, become
easily the tools of intermeddling neighbors.”212 More precisely, the Framers seemed
to fear the possibility of a corrupted Executive above all else. Madison indeed noted
that the president “would not possess those great emoluments from his station, nor
that permanent stake in the public interest, which would place him out of the reach
of foreign corruption.”213 In essence, the FEC was specifically adopted after Charles
Pinkey “urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of the
U. S. independent of external influence.”214 The FEC was thus adopted to protect
against “foreign influence of every sort.”215
Moreover, the Framers also feared corruption as a result of domestic emolu-
ments. Hamilton worried that state government or its officials would be “able to tempt
the President and cause him ‘to surrender’ his ‘judgment to their inclinations,’ while
forcing states to compete with each other to ‘appeal[ ] to his avarice.’”216 Thus the
purpose of the DEC was simple: “[The President] can, of course, have no pecuniary
inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him by the Constitu-
tion.”217 Once again, the evidence suggests that the Framers’ intent was to impera-
tively curb corruption, which warrants a broad definition of “emolument.”
2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/31/14446106/trump-business-cor
ruption-emoluments [https://perma.cc/GM8P-KCBY].
207 See District of Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 895; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 206, at 2.
208 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 206, at 2.
209 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 32–33, District of
Columbia, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (No. 17-1596) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support].
210 See Natelson, supra note 81, at 52; see also Memorandum in Support, supra note 209,
at 32–33.
211 See TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 57.
212 Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, June 18, 1787, in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 120, at 203.
213 Id. at 164.
214 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 85, at 278, 284.
215 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION 215–16 (1833).
216 District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 895 (D. Md. 2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)).
217 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 110, at 442.
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3. Congressional Approval
The modern debate surrounding the Emoluments Clauses also hinges on whether
the president needs to obtain congressional approval before accepting emoluments from
foreign governments under the FEC. In 2017, 30 Senators and 171 Representatives
filed a complaint for alleged violations of the FEC.218 At the root of their complaint lays
the idea that members of Congress are being denied their constitutional prerogative
to accept (or deny) foreign emoluments received by the President.219
Surprisingly, however, the constitutional text on this requirement is quite unam-
biguous. Indeed, the FEC states that no public officer of the U.S. “shall, without the
Consent of the Congress,” accept any emoluments from foreign governments.220 As
such, the language of the FEC “is both sweeping and unqualified.”221 From a purely
textual approach, the FEC effectively bars acceptance of emoluments and only al-
lows exceptions through congressional approval.222 By contrast, the DEC does not
allow for exceptions as the President is simply barred from receiving “any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”223 Looking at the two Emoluments
Clauses together, it would thus appear that the FEC effectively mandates congressio-
nal approval for the receipt of foreign emoluments, while the DEC completely bars
the President for receiving emoluments and does not allow for any leeway.224
Just as unambiguous as the text of the Constitution is the intent of the Framers
on the congressional approval requirement. First, the FEC derived from an earlier
clause drafted in the Articles of Confederation, and passed without much debate.225
The only major distinction between the two clauses is the requirement incorporated
in the FEC that Congress shall give its consent for the acceptance of foreign emolu-
ments.226 James Madison in fact plainly explained to David Humphreys that “the
Constitution of the United States has left with Congress the exclusive authority to
permit the acceptance of presents from foreign Governments by persons holding
Offices under the United States.”227
218 Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2018).
219 First Amended Complaint at 19–20, Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (No. 17-1154).
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
221 Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17
Op. O.L.C. 114, 121 (1993).
222 Id.
223 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
224 Compare id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
225 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1; see Hills, supra note 10, at 71.
226 See also Teachout, supra note 11, at 362. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, with AR-
TICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1.
227 Letter from James Madison to David Humphreys, 5 January 1803, FOUNDERS ONLINE
(emphasis added), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-04-02-0275# [https://
perma.cc/5U96-656M].
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Second, historical evidence suggests that the Framers clearly intended for con-
gressional approval to be mandatory and not a mere encouraged tradition. One
example is the widespread culture of diplomatic gift-giving that was so preponderant
during that era. In fact, it appears that the clause in the Articles of Confederation that
preceded the FEC was largely ignored, as American diplomats kept accepting
foreign gifts throughout the 1980s.228 Silas Deane, for instance, had been intensely
criticized by Arthur Lee for accepting a jeweled snuff box given to him by Louis
XVI in 1770.229
As fate would have it, Lee himself accepted a similar gift only ten years later.230
Confronted with diplomatic standards that would equate refusing a king’s gift to
offending one of the most powerful foreign governments, but knowing that accept-
ing such gift would violate the Articles of Confederation, Lee seemingly started the
practice of seeking congressional approval as to whether he could keep the snuffbox
or not.231 When Benjamin Franklin was offered yet again a similarly ostentatious
gift, he followed Lee’s lead by giving the infamous portrait of Louis XVI encrusted
with diamonds to Congress and sought its approval to keep it, which he was allowed
to do in 1786.232 Three years later, Edmund Randolph, in advocating for the FEC to
be constitutionalized, referred to Franklin’s gift and sought to “prohibit any one in
office from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign states.”233 The con-
gressional approval requirement for foreign emoluments was thus born out of a
tradition that stemmed from the fear of foreign influence, and was made into law
during the Federal Convention.
Third, it is undeniable that the Framers’ efforts were widely motivated by their
desire to provide the people with a legitimate and accountable government.234
228 See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 78–79 (2013); TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 23–24.
229 TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 23–24.
230 LOUIS W. POTTS, ARTHUR LEE, VIRTUOUS REVOLUTIONARY 241 (1981); TEACHOUT,
supra note 94, at 23–24.
231 See TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 23–24.
232 Id. at 26.
233 Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Convention Debates, in DAVID ROBERTSON, DE-
BATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA OF 1788, at 330 (Richmond,
Enquirer-Press 1805).
234 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original
fountain of all legitimate authority.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“I believe it may be laid down as a general rule, that [the people’s]
confidence in and obedience to a government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness
or badness of its administration.”); Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822),
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.20_0155_0159/?sp=1&st=text [https://perma.cc/EWJ3
-LV9L] (“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring
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Indeed, by requiring public officials to seek congressional approval before accepting
foreign emoluments, the FEC not only curbed corruption but also allowed the
citizen-body to hold its elected officials accountable.235 In essence, the FEC’s aim
was to increase transparency.236
This discussion on the FEC and DEC supports three intrinsic conclusions. For one,
the FEC necessarily applies to the Chief Executive. Besides the textual arguments
supporting this position, the Framers’ very fear of corruption—and of a corrupt Chief
Executive in particular—critically suggests that their intent was for the president to
be as much bound by the FEC as other public officials.237 Moreover, because the
Framers also provided the Executive with the most powers over foreign affairs, the
President was de facto to be subjected more to these dangerous foreign influences
than perhaps any other members of the government.238 After all, it was the fear of
foreign influences, epitomized in the diplomatic gift-giving tradition, that led
Madison, Pinkney, and Randolph to argue for a potent FEC.239
Second, the majority of the evidence examined suggests that the Framers intended
for “emoluments” to mean any profit, advantage, gain, or benefit, rather than “profit
arising from an office or employ.”240 Once again, the Framers’ apprehension of cor-
ruption lends support to the theory that the Emoluments Clauses were meant to
constitute the most potent safeguards against corruption.241 A narrower view of
“emoluments” would instead reduce both Clauses to only preventing bribery. An
arguably stronger safeguard against bribery per se, however, is already protected by
the Impeachment Clause.242 Historical evidence indeed suggests that the FEC and
DEC were meant to prevent any temptations that could lead public officials to surrender
to their human nature and prioritize their own interests over the common good.243
Third, the FEC forbids public officials from accepting emoluments without Con-
gress’s approval.244 The events that led to the constitutionalization of the FEC indeed
demonstrate how a mere tradition became black letter law.245 Even if the recipients of
diplomatic gifts only sought to obtain Congress’s consent to maintain a virtuous and
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives.”).
235 TEACHOUT, supra note 94, at 36; Hills, supra note 10, at 101–02.
236 Hills, supra note 10, at 101–02.
237 See supra notes 211–17 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 211–17 and accompanying text.
239 See, e.g., supra note 227 and accompanying text.
240 Memorandum in Support, supra note 209, at 32.
241 See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
242 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
243 See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 228–33 and accompanying text.
2020] THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON CORRUPTION 791
corrupt-free political image, the result is the same—the Framers modified the Articles
of Confederation to promote transparency and accountability through the FEC.246
Taking these three conclusions together supports a broad reading of the Emolu-
ments Clauses. Thus, as applied to the President’s receiving of emoluments, the FEC
should read as such: The Chief Magistrate shall not, without the Consent of the
Congress, accept of any profit, advantage, gain, or benefit of any kind whatever, from
any King, Prince, or foreign State. Similarly, the DEC should read as follows: The
President shall not receive within his mandate any other Emolument profit, advantage,
gain, or benefit from the United States, or any of the States.
B. The Impeachment Clause
The Impeachment Clause presents an interesting dichotomy: both feared and
revered, it constitutes the epitome of the checks and balances system,247 but the
political nature of any impeachment makes the process dangerous and laden with
controversies.248 While the Impeachment Clause itself appears straightforward, de-
fining “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” simply is not.249 Furthermore, impeachment
and criminal laws clash on what truly constitutes “bribery.”250
1. Bribery
Much like corruption, bribery is a well-known offense that retains a certain form
of obscurity. Indeed, unlike treason, it is never defined in the Constitution.251 In fact, an
actual definition of bribery only made its first federal law appearance in 1853.252 Why,
then, did the Framers include “bribery” in the Impeachment Clause? Records from the
Constitution-drafting period contain little information explaining how bribery made it
in to the Impeachment Clause.253 Much like treason, it was almost always included and
little debate arose around the question of bribery.254 There is, however, one plausible
246 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
247 See Tribe, supra note 124, at 716.
248 See id. at 713; see also McDowell, supra note 121, at 628–29.
249 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; Tribe, supra note 124, at 716.
250 See infra notes 277–85 and accompanying text.
251 See HOLTZMAN, supra note 9, at 85.
252 See Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of Bribery Make
Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 466 (2015).
253 See Notes of William Paterson (June 30, 1787), reprinted in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 71, at 506–07; Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 71, at 68; Notes of James Madison (Aug. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 CON-
VENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at 269; Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in
2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at 550; South Carolina Debate, supra note 112, at 251.
254 See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 120, at 49; 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 120,
at 131, 380, 507, 528, 563.
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explanation for this unexpected absence of controversies: that the fear of bribery
itself was, along with treason, the very reason behind the crafting of the Impeach-
ment Clause.255
On July 20, 1787, the Convention discussed a version of the Clause stating that
the President was “[t]o be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice
or neglect of duty.”256 At that point, uncertainty remained as to whether there was
to even be a presidential impeachment mechanism in the Constitution.257 The fear
of foreign bribery, however, anchored the case for establishing an impeachment
mechanism.258 Gouverneur Morris, who was originally opposed to an Impeachment
Clause, eventually explained that:
[The President] may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his
trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to
the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without
being able to guard agst it by displacing him. One would think
the King of England well secured agst bribery. He has as it were
a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed
by Louis XIV.259
Morris’s reference to the two European monarchs is quite telling.260 In 1670, Louis
XIV and Charles II secretly signed the infamous Treaty of Dover, in which Louis
agreed to pay an annual subsidy of 3,000,000 livres in exchange for Charles’s help in
France’s war efforts against the Dutch Republic.261 Charles was also to receive
2,000,000 livres for his restoring the Roman Catholic religion.262 In 1678, Charles II
further negotiated with Louis XIV to receive “six millions of livres, yearly for three
years” in exchange for England’s neutrality in the religion-driven wars of the time.263
255 See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 6.
256 Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 61.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 66, 69; South Carolina Debate, supra note 112, at 251.
259 Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 68–69.
260 See also South Carolina Debate, supra note 112, at 251 (“Hence kings are less liable to
foreign bribery and corruption than any other set of men, . . . indeed, he did not at present re-
collect any instance of a king who had received a bribe from a foreign power, except Charles
II., who sold Dunkirk to Louis XIV.”).
261 See Clyde L. Grose, Louis XIV’s Financial Relations with Charles II and the English
Parliament, 1 J. MOD. HIST. 177, 179–80 (1929).
262 See id. at 180.
263 11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT
TIME 603, 608, 724 (T.B. Howell comp., London, T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter HOWELL’S
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Yet, only five days earlier, a Protestant-friendly British parliament had voted an
appropriation act to support a war against Catholic France.264
The neutrality agreement, directly negotiated by Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby
and Charles’s Lord High Treasurer, thus led to a tremendous uproar on the British
side.265 While Charles II had ordered his Treasurer to negotiate this agreement,266 the
House of Lords began impeachment proceedings against Danby.267 Charles even
admitted to the House that Danby had been acting under his orders.268 However,
since the British king “was beyond their reach, they exercised a constitutional right
in the impeachment of his responsible minister.”269 Charles II was effectively un-
touchable, and Danby was ultimately pardoned by the monarch.270
Charles’s acts first proved that even kings, thought to be “above corruption,”271
could be bribed and influenced. Morris’s reference to Louis XIV’s bribing Charles
II in the very discussion of the Impeachment Clause thus shows that the Framers
were motivated by European history to create a potent impeachment mechanism that
could be used to stop a corrupt executive.272 George Mason expressed this necessity
for an Impeachment Clause to apply to the Chief Magistrate when he explained:
“[n]o point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment could be
continued. Shall any man be above Justice? Above all shall that man be above it,
who can commit the most extensive injustice?”273 The British parliament’s failure
to hold Charles accountable for high treason, in the form of bribery, would have be
known to the Framers,274 which directly supports the assumption that the dreaded
effects of presidential bribery played an important role in arguing for the necessity
of an Impeachment Clause. Believing that the British Constitution was “rotten to the
STATE TRIALS]; see 2 HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM
THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II 409 (London, John Murray &
Albemarle Street, new ed., 1884).
264 See 11 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS, supra note 263, at 604.
265 See BERGER, supra note 36, at 44; 2 HALLAM, supra note 263, at 410; see also 11
HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS, supra note 263, at 724–25.
266 See 2 HALLAM, supra note 263, at 410.
267 See 11 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS, supra note 263, at 725.
268 See id.
269 2 HALLAM, supra note 263, at 410.
270 See 11 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS, supra note 263, at 725.
271 Notes of Alexander Hamilton (June 18, 1787), in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
71, at 304, 310.
272 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note
234, at 149–50 (“Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of
the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. How much this contributed
to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already disclosed.”).
273 Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 65.
274 See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 5.
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very core” “under the hands of bribery and corruption,”275 the Bribery Clause was
a direct response by the Framers to avoid a similar fate for the republic.276
Today, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) mandates the imprisonment of a public official who
“directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to re-
ceive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in
return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act.”277 In 2016,
the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of “official act” in a case involving a
former Virginia governor.278 The decision established two requirements for corrobo-
rating an official act. First, “‘a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or contro-
versy’ involving the formal exercise of governmental power” must be identified.279
Second, “the public official must make a decision or take an action on that question
or matter or agree to do so.”280 In essence, this narrow interpretation of the bribery
statutes made “buying ‘access and ingratiation’” legal under federal law.281
Notwithstanding this interpretation, it is crucial to note that impeachment law
remains distinct from criminal law.282 As Elizabeth Holtzman (a member of the House
Judiciary Committee who voted to impeach Nixon) has noted, impeachment law “is
about protecting our nation and our Constitution from grievous injury at the hands
of a corrupt officeholder. No individuals go to prison as a result of impeachment, but
they do get removed from office.”283 The Court’s decision in McDonnell was spurred
by the fear that a broader interpretation of bribery statutes would enable federal agents
to “cast a pall of potential prosecution” over public officials and their constituents,
which would ultimately reduce political accountability.284 Yet, this concern does not ap-
ply to impeachment law, for which “there’s no shortage of political accountability.”285
As such, impeachable bribery must focus on what the Framers sought to avoid at all
costs: a president who would forego the common good for his own personal gains.
2. High Crimes & Misdemeanors
The term “high crimes and misdemeanors” habitually connotes a certain degree
of severity. We know that such offenses were seen by the Framers as deplorable
275 WOOD, supra note 16, at 12.
276 See Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 71, at 66, 68–69.
277 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012); see also id. § 1951 (2012).
278 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2374–75 (2016); HOLTZMAN, supra
note 9, at 85; Christopher Murphy, McDonnell v. United States—Defining “Official Action”
in Public Corruption Law, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 281–82 (2017).
279 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2374 (internal quotation marks omitted).
280 Id. at 2370.
281 HOLTZMAN, supra note 9, at 85.
282 Id.; see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 32.
283 HOLTZMAN, supra note 9, at 85.
284 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
285 TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 32.
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enough to warrant impeachment, which constitutes the immense power “to doom to
honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of
the community.”286 Nonetheless, “high crimes and misdemeanors” remains a tech-
nical term that is not easily defined.287
Two reasons behind the Framers’ choice of adding “high crimes and misdemean-
ors” to the Impeachment Clause are discernable. In the first place, this term of art
had been repeatedly used in impeachment trials by the British since the fourteenth
century.288 “High crimes and misdemeanors” was first used to impeach Michael de
la Pole, the Earl of Suffolk, in 1386.289 His descendant, William de la Pole, was also
impeached in 1450 for high crimes and misdemeanors and treason.290 Therefore,
even the first British impeachable offenses were specifically designed to curb abuses
of power,291 which further explains the Framers’ choice of language. The trial of
Lord Bacon, charged with bribery and corruption for receiving gifts (even after the
completion of the trial), clearly demonstrates that British common law viewed cor-
ruption as exactly the type of offense that would constitute abuses of power and
ultimately hurt the common good.292 In talking about eighteenth century impeachment
trials, one author explained that “misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the common-
wealth by the abuse of high offices of trust, are the most proper, and have been the
most usual grounds for this kind of prosecution.”293
While the Framers extensively discussed which branch of government should
try impeachments, there was little debate as to what should actually constitute an
impeachable offense.294 To include “high crimes and misdemeanors” was seemingly
agreed upon precisely because it was thought to comprise the offenses that would
injure the common good.295 The fact that “high crimes and misdemeanors” ultimately
brought consensus shows that the Framers chose to build an Impeachment Clause
that was to be as vigorous as possible.296 As Justice Story has argued, the power of the
286 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 129, at 398.
287 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 155 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). See
generally Tribe, supra note 124.
288 McDowell, supra note 121, at 639; see also ALEX SIMPSON, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENTS 86–90 (1916); Barker, supra note 115, at 31; Tribe, supra note 124, at 716.
289 SIMPSON, supra note 288, at 86–87; McDowell, supra note 121, at 637.
290 McDowell, supra note 121, at 637.
291 See id.
292 See discussion supra Section I.B.
293 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 601
(London 1792).
294 See Debates in the Legislature and in Convention of the State of South Carolina, In the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, January 16, 1788, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note
120, at 263–66.
295 See BERGER, supra note 36, at 61.
296 See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 37–38.
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Senate to impeach extends beyond “crimes of a strictly legal character” and “reaches,
what are aptly termed, political offences, growing out of personal misconduct, or
gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the dis-
charge of the duties of political office.”297
It is important to note, however, that the Impeachment Clause was not meant to
confer upon the Senate a power to try virtually any offense that could harm the com-
mon good. The very text of the Clause indicates that impeachment proceedings
should be reserved for offenses as grave as treason and bribery that would inherently
lead to abuses of power and inflict injury on the United States.298 Three distinct
pieces of evidence support this reasoning. First, the offenses of treason and bribery
are linked to high crimes and misdemeanors by the modifier “other.”299 The Framers
had originally thought to include the phrase “high misdemeanor,” but eventually
decided to replace it with “other crimes.”300 In discussing the impeachment of Judge
Samuel Chase in 1805, Joseph Hopkinson seemed to draw this very parallel when
he argued: “Observe, sir the crimes with which these ‘other high crimes’ are classed
in the Constitution, and we may learn something of their character. They stand in
connection with ‘bribery and corruption’—tried in the same manner, and subject to
the same penalties.”301 In other words, the term “high crimes and misdemeanors”
seems to include severe offenses that would be tantamount in gravity to bribery and
treason.302
Second, the use of the adjective “high” before “crimes and misdemeanors” also
suggests that the Framers adopted the common law view that impeachable offenses
effectively entail grave abuses of official power.303 Blackstone, for instance, ex-
plained that “high” in the context of treason did not only refer to the gravity of the
offense but served as a means of distinguishing “petit” crimes against private citi-
zens from injuries to the crown.304 Such a reading of the Clause would align with the
Framers’ view that the very aim of the presidential impeachment process is to curb
abuses of power.
Third, the antepenultimate draft of the Impeachment Clause specified that treason,
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors against the state were impeach-
able offenses.305 “[S]tate” was in turn replaced by “United States” to remove any
297 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 532
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown eds., 2d ed. 1851).
298 See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 38–39.
299 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
300 Tribe, supra note 124, at 717.
301 Joseph Hopkinson, On the Impeachment of Judge Chase, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 120, at 452–53 (emphasis added).
302 See Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 283 (1998).
303 See Tribe, supra note 124, at 720.
304 Id.; see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 40.
305 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 550.
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ambiguity.306 Ultimately, “against the United States” was entirely removed once
again without explanation.307 Yet, the fact that the Framers even sought to include
this distinction suggests that they viewed impeachable offenses as crimes committed
against the nation—crimes that would hurt the common good.308
From a textual standpoint, one can invoke the theory of ejusdem generis to
understand this constitutional link between impeachable offenses.309 Ejusdem generis
indicates that a catchall phrase (such as “and other high crimes and misdemeanors”)
following a series of items (such as “treason, bribery”) necessarily implies the
catchall phrase to solely refer to “things similar to the items that precede it.”310 This
interpretation would suggest that “‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ are offenses of
the same general type as treason and bribery.”311 Indeed, “[t]reason causes the gravest
possible injury to the nation . . . . Bribery is the ultimate corruption of office—an
exercise of power for private benefit, not public good. Both offenses drastically
subvert the Constitution and involve an unforgivable abuse of the presidency.”312 It
thus follows that other impeachable offenses should share these traits: namely injury
to the nation and unforgivable abuse of the presidency.
This discussion of the Emoluments and Impeachment Clauses has demonstrated
that the Executive anti-corruption framework was specifically designed to create
broad, potent safeguards. One reason behind such a broad framework is the idea that
the Constitution was meant to withstand the test of time.313 In essence, the inclusion
of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” instead of limiting the Impeachment Clause
to a specific list of offenses, was agreed upon to establish a flexible standard as “it
would be impossible to anticipate every act that might someday require impeach-
ment.”314 The FEC was similarly broadly worded to effectively encompass all foreign
influences, even those that might not have been foreseen at the time. Once again, the
Framers’ fear of corruption—and of foreign influences in general—led them to
create a broad and adaptable framework, which would not only protect the Republic
from abuses of power but also ensure the durability of the Constitution itself. Be-
cause “a well-written constitution cannot ‘partake to the prolixity of a legal code,’”315
the Framers designed a flexible framework that could evolve as needed.
306 Id. at 551.
307 See id.
308 See McDowell, supra note 121, at 633–34; Sunstein, supra note 302, at 288–89. But see
Tribe, supra note 124, at 719–20 (arguing that “against the United States” was only removed
to avoid redundancy).
309 See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 38.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 129, at 346.
314 See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 9, at 27.
315 Id.
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IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: PRIMACY OF POLITICAL
VIRTUE AS ALLEGIANCE TO THE LAW
Montesquieu, whose republican ideals greatly influenced the Framers,316 believed
that “[l]aws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising
from the nature of things.”317 “These relations . . . together constitute . . . Spirit of
the Laws.”318 Hence, “only by appreciating the ‘spirit’ of laws can their letter be en-
forced.”319 In essence, attempting to enforce the anti-corruption framework demands
this same appreciation. In doing so, one must note the crucial distinction between
moral virtue and what Montesquieu called “political virtue.”320
A. Political Virtue
For Montesquieu, political virtue is “the love of one’s country, and of equality.”321
“It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political virtue; and it is the spring which
sets the republican government in motion . . . .”322 This distinction is essential
because it sheds light on what the Framers attempted to accomplish in creating
constitutional anti-corruption safeguards. Classical views advocated moral virtue as
the indispensable component for successful governments, suggesting that only those
who did not have any desire to rule would be virtuous leaders.323 At common law,
this same virtuous morality, borne out of religious precepts, was seen as a crucial
element if one was to put the common good ahead of personal interests.324
The Framers, however, took a different route. While these ideals undeniably
influenced the “spirit” of the Constitution, there is one main divergence between the
Framers and the common law (as inspired by the Classical view) on the ideal ruler.
This divergence stems from the Framers’ belief in “energy in government”—the idea
that government must be effective and thus attract the best possible leaders, a concept
embedded in the Incompatibility Clause.325 Some argued that stricter standards of cor-
ruption would deter capable individuals from public service, while other maintained
316 See generally Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the
Framing of the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1990).
317 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 18 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1749).
318 Id. at 23.
319 Bergman, supra note 316, at 8.
320 See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 317, at 16–17.
321 Id. at 16.
322 Id. at 17.
323 See discussion supra Section I.A.
324 See discussion supra Section I.B.
325 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; Natelson, supra note 81, at 31.
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the necessity of rigorous standards.326 Madison spearheaded the debate for the laxer
standard camp, and Wilson is said to have defended his proposal: “The members of
the Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least profitable task of any who engage in
the service of the state. Ought this merit to be made a disqualification?”327 Ultimately,
Madison’s proposal became part of the Constitution,328 which prevents Congress
from enriching the Legislature, while allowing ambition by enabling members to be
appointed to other offices.329 This Clause exemplifies the Framers’ struggle between
encouraging the best people to hold office and guarding the democracy against
abuses.330 In doing so, the Framers practically thought that they were preserving the
common good by allowing the most qualified individuals to lead.331
Once it had been determined that ambition—even if it could potentially lead to
more corruption—was desirable, an anti-corruption system still had to be imple-
mented. Indeed, both the Emoluments Clauses and the Impeachment Clause were
largely designed to curb future leaders’ greed and inherent abuses of power. The
Emoluments Clauses served as a means to encourage the president’s political virtue
by promoting the public interest.332 If such virtue was to be lacking, however, the
menace of the Impeachment Clause would serve as a deterrent—and as a potential
escape clause.333
B. Allegiance to the Law
This analysis of the Emoluments and Impeachment Clauses has demonstrated
that the fear of a corrupt Executive largely sprung from the Framers’ lack of trust
in human nature.334 Foreign gifts and other emoluments could be tempting enough to
corrupt the most virtuous leaders. Betting the stability of the nascent democracy on fu-
ture leaders’ uncertain moral virtue was inherently unconceivable.335 The answer was
thus to be found in promoting political virtue, instead of relying on mere moral virtue.
Going back to Montesquieu, one gains political virtue through allegiance to the
laws. Indeed, “the honest man . . . is not the Christian, but the political honest man, . . . .
He is the man who loves the laws of his country, and who is actuated by the love of
326 Natelson, supra note 81, at 33; see also Notes of Robert Yates (June 23, 1787),
reprinted in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 71, at 392.
327 Notes of James Madison (June 23, 1787), reprinted in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 71, at 387.
328 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
329 Natelson, supra note 81, at 34.
330 Id. at 39–41.
331 See Teachout, supra note 11, at 375, 380.
332 See id. at 374.
333 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 116, at 396.
334 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
335 See James D. Savage, Corruption and Virtue at the Constitutional Convention, 56 J.
POL. 174, 177–78 (1994).
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those laws.”336 The Framers essentially adopted a similar view by requiring absolute
allegiance to the Supreme Law of the land.337 The Constitution itself conveys this
attempt to render allegiance to the law the ultimate safeguard against corruption.
Indeed, two constitutional clauses create an absolute presidential duty to respect and
obey the law: the Take Care Clause and the Presidential Oath Clause.338 Through the
Take Care Clause, the President was expected to encourage faithful execution of the
laws,339 and the Presidential Oath Clause obliged the President to “preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution.”340 In fact, the Presidential Oath Clause was seen “as
one of the ‘great checks’ in the [Constitution] against abuse of power.”341
Hamilton further believed that “the sanctity of an oath” would bound public
officials to the “SUPREME LAW of the land.”342 As the “Chief Magistrate,” the
President is “the principal officer who must obey and properly carry out the law.”343
Oath-taking had been an established practice in England and in the American colo-
nies, and was seen as a sacred moment.344 As such, the Framers believed that “a
President who publicly promises to defend the Constitution is more likely to do
so.”345 Therefore, the Presidential Oath Clause does appeal to the President’s virtue,
but also serves as a deterrent if virtue comes to be lacking. In sum, the very “spirit”
of the Constitution promotes political virtue through its core plea for future leaders’
unconditional allegiance to the law.
CONCLUSION
“There is another provision against the danger . . . of the President receiving
emoluments from foreign powers. If discovered he may be impeached,” explained
Randolph during the Virginia Convention.346 Randolph’s statement exemplifies the
very structure of the Executive anti-corruption framework applicable to the President.
Indeed, the Framers created constitutional anti-corruption clauses that, together,
336 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 317, at 17.
337 See David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 71, 81 (2009). See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37
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341 Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2112, 2129 (2019).
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344 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Rudd, Our Oath of Office: A Solemn Promise, 78 FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL. Sept. 2009, at 23–24.
345 See Driesen, supra note 337, at 84; Kent et al., supra note 341, at 2128.
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would establish a broad, potent framework. If the President were to violate the
Emoluments Clauses, he could be impeached because the receiving of emoluments
is de facto corruption.
The very text of the Emoluments Clauses shows that the Framers intended to
create a broad framework to encompass all acts of corruption that could endanger
the common good. While “corruption” was removed from the original draft of the
Impeachment Clause, the inclusion of both “bribery” and “high crimes and misde-
meanors” effectively renders corruption impeachable in any case. Once again, the
fact that “bribery” was almost always included, and that “corruption” was replaced
by the broader “high crimes and misdemeanors,” demonstrates the Framers’ intent
to design a broad framework. Moreover, the Faithful Execution Clauses demand
political virtue from the Chief Executive and are designed to protect against corrup-
tion.347 Taken together, this framework imposes a duty on the President to adhere to
the law by promoting political virtue. The Emoluments Clauses and the Impeach-
ment Clause further ensure that the nation’s interests remain protected.
When impeachment proceedings began against Richard Nixon, an article of
impeachment was proposed for the President’s alleged violation of the Emoluments
Clauses.348 While said article was defeated (16–12), “nobody on the Judiciary
Committee questioned whether a president could be impeached for violating the
emoluments clause.”349 In essence, the Framers specifically designed a loose frame-
work devised to withstand the test of time. The Impeachment Clause was seen as a last
remedy and is thus neither meant to be used on a whim nor to further political agendas.
Yet, when political virtue comes to be lacking, as is the case for latent violations of
the Emoluments Clauses, the Impeachment Clause provides for a sharp remedy that
can shield the people “from the abuse or violation of some public trust.”350
347 See Ryan S. Killian, Faithfully Interpreting ‘Faithfully’ (manuscript at 14), https://
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